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This series of reflections on the contemporary experience and consciousness of time calls for 
a radical rethinking to confront the present and future threat of climate-led disaster.  Focusing 
on the pocketwatch and smartwatch, the article will consider Paul Virilio’s critique of 
contemporary forms of alienation and the ever-increasing disjuncture between human 
experience and the instruments that measure and analyse time in the service of the global, 
financial market. Jean-Pierre Dupuy’s ‘enlightened catastrophism’ is proposed as opening up 
possibilities for a politics of time which can reposition the present in the service of a future 
threatened by the vicissitudes of late capitalism. The paper goes on to argue that Dupuy needs 
to be reread alongside Virilio, taking into account the latter’s notion of ‘time pollution’ and 
critique of forecasting. The conceptual framings proposed are elucidated with reference to a 
cinematic tradition that takes the multiple temporalities shaping human existence as its object. 
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Introduction.  
This article is about taking time. It brings together a series of reflections on forms of 
experience and consciousness of time within late capitalism. While the expression 
‘late capitalism’ was adopted by Marxists, including notably Ernest Mandel, to refer 
to post-war economic development and consumerism, it has more recently been more 
generically applied to the Neoliberal ideologies of the late twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries. In particular, it is used to describe the expansion of work beyond the 
traditional temporal and spatial parameters of the Fordist model and the ways in 
which modes of capitalist production and consumption effectively appropriate 
attempts at critique or resistance. Moreover, the use of ‘late’ is also imbued with the 
tentative hope that capitalism is nearing an end. Such hope is, however, coupled with 
the increasing concern that what is actually coming to an end are the possibilities for 
sustained human existence on an ever-hotter planet.  
In this context, the central claim the article puts forward is that a radical 
rethinking of time is necessary both to imagine and confront the vicissitudes of 
widespread climate change and related ecological stress (for example, loss of 
biodiversity, acidification etc.). This is a crisis which has of late come to be termed 
the Anthropocene, both in the present and as a future-past, a what will have been. The 
critique is framed within a wider analysis of what Robert Marzec has termed 
‘environmentality’ – a term he develops from Michel Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality – used to explore the military discourses which are working to define 
and, more significantly, limit potential responses to climate disaster and its aftermath 
(Marzec: 2015, 25). For Marzec, such responses have been developed according to 
longstanding military strategies based upon the ongoing securitization of territory and 
resources. Moreover, the scientific methods used to predict and understand potential 
climate threats are themselves based on a normative, singular time-line conception of 
temporality. Using the example of epigenetic memory, and specifically the ability of 
certain plants to ‘remember’ long-term environmental factors such as seasonal 
changes, Marzec explains how such processes are undermined or destroyed by a 
homogeneous understanding of time as development or speed imposed by the 
‘anthropocentric human’: 
 
We might, consequently, productively identify the ‘anthropocentric human’ (the human 
acting as a geological force) as the species that transcends or goes beyond the epigenetic limit 
of its specific environments— destroying  the distinct, heterogeneous temporality of 
ecosystems in favor of a war-oriented ‘genetic disposition.’ This war- oriented ‘genetics,’ it 
should be emphasized, is only one among many possible dispositions. It owes its prevalence, 
as we’ve seen, to specific historically and politically influenced patterns of development. In 
turn, this image of the human also speeds up particular processes by developing a pattern that, 
when normalized, transcends the distinct qualities that other organisms attempt to maintain in 
their epigenetic memories: the militarized human moves from heterogeneous movements to a 
unidirectional and accelerating rate of speed. (Marzec, 164) 
 
Taking up Marzec’s critique of a ‘militarized’ conception of temporality and 
the impact of this on different ecosystems, this article focuses specifically on personal 
and collective experiences of time as predicated on technology that works to maintain 
existing social and economic hierarchies. Consequently dependence upon time 
technologies precludes possibilities for alternative forms of existence and temporal 
multiplicity, including those necessary to survive and thrive in a world rendered 
increasingly hostile to certain forms of human life (as well as to other forms of 
organic life). Such technologies, I will argue, are embodied in the ideal forms of the 
time-piece, taking specifically the pocketwatch described by Marx in Capital Volume 
1 and then its latter day equivalent, the smartwatch. 
Considering first of all Marx’s account of the increasingly fragmented labour 
involved in the production of the pocketwatch, it is possible to develop a discussion of 
time as being increasingly fragmented, divided into ‘ever finer slicings’ (Durham 
Peters, 2015:200). If we then consider how Paul Virilio explores the notion of the 
‘lag’ we can get at a key element of recent thinking aimed at challenging 
contemporary forms of alienation that are the consequence of an ever-increasing 
disjuncture between human experience and technological recordings of time. In her 
exploration of the concept of the ‘lag’, Sarah Sharma (2014) considers the disjuncture 
produced between different ‘presents’ and the various forms of subjectivities 
produced through these multiple experiences of ‘lag’. Her insistence that we think of 
these different ‘presents’ and their respective ‘subjectivities’ comparatively is 
necessary to a greater, more nuanced understanding on how the ‘lag’ impacts upon 
the relationship of these ‘presents’ to a longer term past and future. The experience of 
the jet-lagged corporate traveller negotiating time zones is considered alongside that 
of the (taxi) cab-lagged service industry worker obliged to work antisocial shifts to 
smooth the passage through time and space of the higher paid executive at the 
detriment of their own temporal experience. Likewise, my analysis of the ‘lag’ 
focuses on the disjuncture produced between the representation of time and our ability 
to engage meaningfully with such representation. The notion of the ‘lag’ as defined 
by Virilio, in particular in his discussion of ‘instant replay’, will be followed by a 
discussion of the smartwatch as contemporary timepiece. The smartwatch redefines 
our experience of time not simply in its representation of temporalities but, moreover, 
in its ability to track, capture and re-present multiple versions of how we exist and 
operate within normative cyclical and linear temporal structures. 
The temporal alienation caused by the lag creates a debt, the payment of 
which is endlessly deferred. The notion of future debt is explored in terms of the need 
for a revised understanding of time predicated on individual and collective ethical 
responsibility. Having suggested how the ‘self-care’ promoted in the use of 
smartwatches circumvents the potential for care and responsibility which fall outside 
the circuits of the ‘quantified self’, the article will look at Jean-Pierre Dupuy’s 
‘enlightened catastrophism’ as opening up the possibility for a new politics of time 
which places the present in the service of a future threatened by global warming. I 
will then suggest that Dupuy needs to be reread alongside Virilio (and Marzec), 
taking into account the Virilio’s notion of ‘time pollution’ and critique of forecasting. 
The danger is of course that these technologies capture temporality in an increasingly 
militarised (Marzec 2015) and regimented way, wholly amenable to advanced 
corporate structures, finance capital, and deep algorithms of profit and power. 
Throughout the article, I will reference a number of films whose exploration 
of different temporalities serves to elucidate some of the concepts discussed. In this 
respect, I am drawing on a methodology adopted in The Ends of the World (Danowski 
and Viveiros de Castro, 2017). More implicit perhaps in my approach is the 
acknowledgement of the emergence of a narrative tradition within cinema which, in 
the wake of Chris Marker’s La Jetée (1962), has taken time as its subject, providing 
the most sustained possibility for reimagining time available to a global audience. 
With the exception of Last Night (1998), the discussion of which plays a similar 
function to Danowski and Viveiros de Castro’s use of Lars Von Triers’ Melancholia 
(2011), the films I discuss are taken up with the notion of time travel. Remaining 
sensitive to the inherent conservatism at work in Dupuy’s reading of the future 
anterior and the ideological limits of the films cited, the article’s use of such 
narratives nevertheless adopts an approach to the question of future debt which might 
be mapped onto Dupuy’s call for storytelling and mythmaking embodied in his own 
use of parable. 
 
From timepieces to time in pieces 
The first task here is to challenge existing rhythms of reading and the temptation to 
skim and skip. This means calling on the reader to spend time, to pause and to wait. 
To open up and begin again, it seems apt to consider the watch, the temporal object or 
device, par excellence, identifying its production and development as intrinsically 
bound up with social organization of time in capitalist society. Therefore, I ask the 
reader to take the time to read this extract from the first volume of Karl Marx’s 
Capital, a text which requires a mode of reading to match the process invoked in this 
powerful cumulative account of the division of manufacture and labour in industrial 
society: 
 
Formerly the individual creation of a craftsman from Nuremberg, the watch has been 
transformed into the social product of an immense number of specialized workers, such as 
mainspring makers, dial makers, spiral-spring makers, jeweled hole makers, ruby lever 
makers, hand makers, case makers, screw makers, gilders. Then there are numerous 
subdivisions, such as wheel makers (with a further division between brass and steel), pin 
makers, movement makers, acheveurs de pignon (who fix the wheels on the axles and polish 
the facets), pivot makers, planteurs de finissage (who put the wheels and springs in the 
works), finisseurs de barillet (who cut teeth for the wheels, make the holes of the right size, 
etc.), escapement makers, cylinder makers for cylinder escapements, escapement wheel 
makers, makers of the raquette (the apparatus for regulating the watch), planteurs 
d’échappement (escapement makers proper); then repasseurs de barillet (who finish the box 
for the spring), steel polishers, wheel polishers, screw polishers, figure painters, dial 
enamellers (who melt the enamel of the copper), fabricants de pendants (who make the ring 
by which the case is hung), finisseurs de charnière (who put the brass hinges in the cover), 
graveurs, ciseleurs, polisseurs de boîte, etc., etc., and last of all the repasseurs, who fit 
together the whole watch and hand it over in a going state. (Marx, 1976 [1867]: 461-2). 
 
Here, Marx writes in a way that stresses repetitive separation, the words of the list of 
component tasks themselves perform a tick-tock multiplication of effect. He is 
thereby making the fundamental point about the reorganization and division of labour 
which fragments the manufacturing process into a series of micro-processes or tasks. 
Each individual involved in the process is henceforth assigned the same, repetitive 
activity, isolated from other processes. This is aimed at producing greater efficiency 
via specialization whilst actually evoking a mind-numbing monotony and systemic 
form of what we now refer to as repetitive strain. However, I want to shift the focus 
slightly from Marx’s discussion of the division of labour in order to think more 
specifically about his choice of object – the watch as instrument for measuring 
cyclical time. 
With the exception of the task of the repasseurs, whose role is to assemble the 
watch, the processes at work in producing this instrument of measurement are divided 
until each task bears as little relation to the finished concept and product of the watch 
as possible. As Marx indicates, there are also even differences and specialization 
between repasseurs. In thinking about the extreme level of fragmentation involved in 
producing the pocket watch, can we not recognize the same thing occurring to time 
itself? Today instruments for measuring time, dividing it into nano as well as 
milliseconds, are once again implicated in varieties of interpretative affiliation to the 
alienation of human consciousness from the production and circulation of value. The 
ability to extract value from today’s financial market is a matter of time and privilege, 
in effect the representation of access to real time, defined by the ability to calculate, 
recalculate, buy and sell inside the infinitesimal interstices which slice up trading 
hours, minutes and seconds. 
As units of time get ever smaller, the notion of duration gives way to that of a 
series of instants, and/or an eternal present. Yet, since we are unable to experience 
and thus grasp the coming and going of each instant, there is always a lag. Embodied 
in this lag is a failure to keep track of the ever-smaller units of time – Marx's list of 
tasks, and the overall controlling consciousness – and the spaces that cross in 
between. 
 
Virilio’s Instant Replay 
Building on his earlier critique of speed, in The Great Accelerator (2012) Virilio 
defines the opening decades of the twenty-first century in terms of a single market 
‘turbocapitalism’, an accelerated form of capitalism, predicated upon the operation of 
a series of ‘nanochronologies’, most notably those calculation tools used by financial 
traders but which are pervading all aspects of social and industrial life.i For Virilio, 
such chronologies of the ‘infinitely short-term’ (Virilio, 2012: 3) are replacing longer 
divisions of time - days, years, centuries - along with our experience of such 
divisions. The inevitable outcome is what Virilio terms ‘the insecurity of History.’ 
The clear delineation between past, present and future gives way to a privileging of 
the ‘instant’. Such an instant is projected towards a future yet as such precludes the 
possibility of this future: ‘To live every instant as though it were the last – that is the 
paradox of futurism, of a futurism of the instant that had no future.’ (Virilio, 2012: 1) 
Instant replay embodies a further paradox of this eternal present. The 
expression ‘instant replay’ is itself oxymoronic. Moreover, not only has it come, via 
the television screen, to define our experience of the ‘event’ but it has also defined the 
event itself. Virilio uses the example of the football stadium where the live action of 
the game is accompanied by giant screens offering spectators the ‘mediated’ 
experience they are used to watching at home (Virilio, 2001:64). The immediate 
repetition of an event via instant replay negates or defers the initial experience of an 
event. The effects of such a deferral might be considered via three different examples. 
Firstly, the replay function allows for the possibility of going back over something at 
a later moment and subsequently both reduces and paradoxically enhances the impact 
and value of the initial viewing. While the replay may entail a process of revisiting 
which must necessarily involve more time than the initial occurrence of the event, 
clearly the ability to replay, slow down, speed up and re-present events can lead to 
new forms of experience and engagement. What is at stake in Virilio’s reading is the 
paradox in which the instant replay becomes a waste of time or engenders a paralysis 
in which the differences produced by repetition are either insignificant or toxic in 
their obsession with a single moment. 
To illustrate this we might appropriate Virilio’s example of Olympic Gold 
medallist, Usain Bolt. To fully appreciate both Bolt’s speed and the minute difference 
between the time he takes to run 100m and that of his closest rivals, we cannot simply 
watch a race once in real time. Multiple slow motion replays, each with a duration 
extending beyond the initial sub-10 second race, are required to ascertain his exact 
speed, technique and the extent of his victory. We cannot experience these without the 
aid of both advanced timepieces, the visual prostheses of the video camera and screen, 
and an aesthetic appreciation, with commentary, appropriate to the medium of the 
race. The once classical Olympic footrace becomes subordinated to its subsequent 
techno-aesthetic framing and representation. Second, as a result of instant replay, our 
initial affective response to an event or set of images is displaced by a posthumous 
reading, which is frequently an over-reading. As Virilio suggests, ‘[W]hat is given is 
exactly the information but not the sensation’ (Virilio, 1991a: 46). It is a reading 
which is always at once too late and too soon. 
 
Shock and Awe in the Deserts of Theory 
To appropriate a terminology from another sphere of alienation, the military context 
of accelerated neocolonial war, original shock and awe at an advance of human 
capacity for speed gives way increasingly to a form of shock treatment as 
entertainment in which we are obliged to recognize the significance of an event 
through the sheer force of its repetition in the medium of montage, sound bites and 
infographics: 
 
[T]he more informed man [sic] is the more the desert of the world expands around him, the 
more the repetition of information (already known) upsets the stimuli of observation, 
overtaking the automatically, not only in memory (interior light) but first of all in the look, to 
the point that from now on it’s the speed of light itself which limits the reading of information 
and the important thing in electronic information is no longer the storage but the display 
(Virilio, 1991a: 46) 
 
For Virilio, writing in the 1980s and 1990s, it was the moon landing that encapsulated 
this ‘desert of the world’. The inertia of the moon’s ‘dead center’ finds its double in 
the replaying of Armstrong’s descent from the Eagle (Virilio, 1991b: 127). Yet, it was 
only at the start of the twenty-first century that the full force of the instant replay 
became burned onto collective consciousness. The moon landing defined the United 
States as global superpower via its televised colonisation of space symbolised in the 
first footprint that was later doubled with the planting of the Star-spangled banner. 
Two generations later, it is in the image of the collapse of the World Trade Center in 
Lower Manhattan, home of global finance, that we find the negative affirmation of the 
earlier definition. Where a flag was planted in the original footage, here an imaginary 
line is drawn instead between Western democracy and freedom and a totalitarian 
terror projected onto the East. After the initial twenty minutes or so of confusion and 
horror at the sight of black smoke billowing from the World Trade Centre on 
September 11, 2001, the world’s media began its endless loop of WTC images, a loop 
which over almost two decades later still continues to frame the U.S. political 
imagination. It is here that we encounter Slavoj Žižek’s take up of the quote from 
Morpheus in The Matrix (1999), where the Christ-like Neo is welcomed to the ‘desert 
of the real’ in an apocalyptic future that is somehow consequent upon extended 
militaristic-machinic alienation. In Žižek’s rendering the phrase is extended to the 
event turned non-event, the spectacular collapse of the twin towers already mediated 
by big budget Hollywood action movies (Žižek , 2002: 11). 
 The compulsion to capture and document anything and everything facilitated 
by instant replay, along with freeze frame, fast forward and zoom functions, results in 
a life lived vicariously through a viewfinder with reduced or hyper (alienated) 
attention paid to what is actually being recorded. An increasing imbalance or gap 
arises between what we are able to perceive directly and the media technologies 
which Virilio collectively describes as the ‘squared horizon’ (Virilio, 2005: 20ff). 
Such a gap has serious ethical implications as we shift our judgment from the things 
captured to the processes of capturing. Furthermore, such technologies perhaps work 
best when they keep us in a state of (cinematic) illusion, preventing us from fully 
coming to terms with this shift in our focus and the consequences of this ‘generalized 
delirium of interpretation’. While we might insist that there is no such thing as an 
‘unmediated’ event, what is at stake in extending Virilio’s critique is how possibilities 
for fruitful, sustained engagement and analysis give way to endless processes of 
capture, storage and classification, at the same time that a rush to provide commentary 
on the ‘here and now’ reduces the critical distance required for analysis. 
The replay function exists to reassure us that we can watch it all properly 
(again) later. Except that we can’t. In Don McKellar’s 1998 film, Last Night, the 
world is about to come to an end. People have known this for months and the film 
explores the attempts of various characters to spend the time in a meaningful way. For 
Patrick Wheeler whose wife died of cancer the previous year, the end of the world is 
just a macrocosmic repetition of the microcosm he has already lived through. Wheeler 
spends the first part of the ‘last night’ having dinner with his family during which 
Grandma is still denied bacon due to her cholesterol by her overzealous daughter and 
old family movies play on the TV in the background. As Grandma points out 
whimsically, ‘when did they expect to watch all this?’ Thus, the film’s basic premise 
is that it is only when there is no more time that we are forced to confront exactly how 
we understand or, more precisely, misunderstand time and our experience of it. 
To develop a politics of time which offers the means to think the future 
beyond its servitude to a perpetual present embodied in the endless commercial loop 
of instant replay and the military-entertainment apocalyptic narrative it smuggles in 
alongside, we need to think more critically about the ‘lag’ produced as a result of this 
servitude. How might we start to explain this notion of ‘lag’ that exists and which is 
increasing between human experience and technological representation of time? At 
stake once more is the untenable accumulation of ‘experience’ to watch, 
live…experience at a later date. Here, the idea of debt will be useful. 
This lag might be linked with the accrual and subsequent deferral of economic 
debt to a future. But a future which will never and which can never come, a secular 
End-time where all debts are settled. Here, further caution is required. Perhaps we 
need to resist a debilitating critique of instant gratification which repeats the gesture 
of such gratification via its own masochistic wallowing in this temporal paralysis. We 
might go as far as to define Virilio’s attack on technological development in terms of 
such wallowing, not least in his apparent privileging of the hyperbolic over analysis, 
embodied in his capitalization of hybrid terminology (TURBOCAPITALISM; 
NANOCHRONOLOGIES). Creating more terms with which to name a problem does 
little to resolve the problem and ends up reproducing the same inertia Virilio laments. 
A detailed critique of Virilio’s use of capitalization and other rhetorical traits can be 
found in McCaffrey (2015) but his insights are important if extended into a context 
that thinks – slowly perhaps – the consequences of hyper-singular temporality that 
accelerates the collapse of those environments necessary for any life, or thinking, 
whatsoever, and this applies whether or not the fastest man can outrun the future. In 
balancing Virilio against a breathless Marx, the aim is to articulate a concern with 
care to be developed below. While this is perhaps not a move that would be endorsed 
as following either Virilio or his critics, what is there for the taking is a potential 
reconfiguration through time as an experiment in imaging other possible worlds as 
real potential. 
Moreover, it is useful to take up Sharma’s critique of depoliticised concepts of 
time and speed which via their generalisation ignore what she terms ‘power-
chronographies’. In order to invoke a multiple temporality with time to consider the 
potentials of ethical action in a longer interval than that allowed between commercial 
breaks, we also may want to avoid a too-easy discussion of deferred payment that 
lends itself to discourses aimed at criminalizing poverty via the lamentation of a 
society unable to think past the next pay packet, holiday or sale bargain. Instead, we 
might identify the lag with something else not purely financial or monetary. It is here 
that we might find the possibility of ethical responsibility and action. Such 
responsibility has become deferred and suspended to a future that will never come. 
 
Quantified Selves: Smart Watching 
If the starting point for others here is the organization of labour embodied in the plight 
of Marx’s watchmakers, to rethink labour and production first requires us to radically 
reconsider our experience of time. E.P. Thompson suggested that workers’ struggles 
over time always took place within the parameters of a certain conception of labour-
time, ‘[t]hey had accepted the categories of their employers and learned to fight back 
within them’ (Thompson, 1967: 86). Sharma calls for a new more democratic form of 
time which in the first instance acknowledges time as ‘entangled’ (Sharma, 2014: 
150). Both identify the need to radically contest the notion of time organised around a 
normative working day. To this I would add that such a contestation needs to be 
predicated on notions of community and care that operate outside the conventional 
parameters of labour and could be considered in terms of maintaining labour capacity, 
the reproductive health of the workforce, much discussed (for example, see Federici 
2012). Conversely, the watch, marker of wealth and symbol of individual possession 
of time, maintains the power-chronographies identified by Sharma. The watch, once 
banned among factory workers (Thompson, 86), frames time as a matter of individual 
subjectivity, power and agency. 
Our initial considerations of the pocket watch led to the measurement or 
calculation of time as divided into ever-smaller units. However, alongside the 
nanochronologies identified by Virilio as often engendering our alienation from 
longer-term notions of history and the responsibility demanding by both the past and 
future, we might consider briefly the arrival of the smartwatch and the possibilities it 
appears to offer for the commercialisation of both self-knowledge and self-care.  
As John Durham Peters has suggested in his brilliant exposition of clocks, ‘a 
watch is a counter, a pointer, a stargazer, a body technique, and a pet’ (Durham 
Peters, 2015: 226). This description seems particularly apt for thinking about today’s 
smartwatches as they measure, record, calculate and organize with ever-greater 
degrees of imperceptible accuracy and variegated data. The advent of the smartwatch 
is linked to the ‘quantified self’ movement begun in 2007 by Gary Wolf and Kevin 
Kelly but which arguably originated with the use of self-monitoring devices in the 
1970s. The ability to ‘synchronise’ our watches with other electronic devices – 
phones, computers, tablets – offers us the possibility of an increasingly ‘quantified 
self’, informing us how far and how regularly we’ve moved and how well we have 
slept. The founding logic of the movement is based on increased self-awareness of 
health achieved through close daily monitoring of heart rate, sleep patterns, exercise 
and weight. In theory personal monitoring of these provides greater agency and 
management of long-term health than reliance on sporadic health check-ups. 
However, with the clear facility of worker surveillance in mind, it is interesting to 
note that many of the early adopters of such devices worked in data analytics or 
biotechnology and were interested in the economic potential in developing such tools 
for a mass market. More recently, the use of smartwatches has become increasingly 
linked to health insurance particularly in the United States. While there are questions 
being raised as to accuracy of the data being generated and the possibilities of having 
such data hacked or shared without users full consent, it seems highly likely that 
wearing a device like the Fitbit will become standard fare in many companies and, 
perhaps also, places of study. This is also in spite of warnings about the potential for 
‘obsessive’, unhealthy behaviour encouraged by such devices.ii The location of secret 
U.S. and other military bases around the world have recently been revealed as a result 
of personnel using the Strava fitness tracker which produces a ‘heat map’ composed 
of GPS points logged during a run or jog (Hern, 2018). 
The disjuncture or ‘lag’ between affective experience of time and space and its 
recording and display is not simply a design by-product but fundamental to the 
functioning of the smartwatch. We need it to tell us something different. Moreover, 
the systems of ‘virtual’ rewards (in the case of the Fitbit, these take the form of 
distance ‘badges’ achieved in a single day or within a user’s Fitbit ‘lifetime’) and the 
recording of one’s failures to achieve a given number of steps or hours of sleep within 
the space of a day, frames subjectivity within the parameters of a limited set of data 
capture and interpretation. Its suggested targets (10,000 steps, 8 hours sleep) are 
configured according to the normative temporalities of desk-based labour and 
working hours. To use a smartwatch collectively, to share your data with others, is to 
use it competitively. Yet in competing with others the benchmark for ‘healthy’ 
behaviour is raised ever higher and rendered more and more complicated. This is the 
pact, Durham Peters informs us, we have had little choice in making: ‘[t]he watch is a 
prime symbol of modernity, a time bomb marking out Faustian mortgage of ourselves 
to things we did not actively chose but will not give up.’ (225) Thus, while a bullet to 
the clocks might seem in order here, the question we might pose instead would be to 
ask how we might reconfigure or reappropriate such devices in the service of radical 
politics of time taken up not with a limited, quotidian self-care but, rather, projected 
towards a future as care? 
 
Dupuy: Reimagining what will have been 
To begin to explore the notion of future care without prescribing what this might 
involve, we need to return to the idea of future debt as created via reckless production 
and consumption patterns themselves maintained by the perpetual availability of a 
globalised labour force. The notion of future debt is a key debate within the wider 
context of contemporary ecocriticism. There have been various attempts to argue in 
favour of reparations to be paid to future victims for the damage done, suffering 
caused by industrial modes of production over the past two hundred years (see, for 
example, O’Neill, 1997). To some extent, this involves a reversal of Walter 
Benjamin’s claims in On the Origin of History (1940) where he evokes the Angel of 
History thrown into the future by the pile up of wreckage in the past. Our 
responsibility lies not only with the victims of history but those of the future. Yet, like 
the notion of reparation for past atrocities, the possibility of such reparation ever 
achieving anything like compensation for the widespread disaster and suffering 
caused is moot. 
Against this idea of future debt, Dupuy’s ‘catastrophisme éclairé’ works along 
the lines of what might be termed ‘insurance’. However, unlike the individual cases of 
medical treatment covered by the health insurance alluded to above, here insurance 
refers to the management of widespread collective disaster. In the final scene of 
Twelve Monkeys, Terry Gilliam’s 1995 remake of La Jetée, one of the scientists from 
the future takes her seat on a plane next to the man in possession of the virus which 
will effectively wipe out most of humanity. The scientist introduces herself as 
working in ‘insurance’, a euphemism for her time-travelling mission to limit rather 
than prevent the extent of the damage caused by the release of the virus.iii 
Insurance involves the wager that disaster in the future is a given. In this sense 
it works according to the logic of the future anterior – what will have been. For Dupuy 
(2004), historical time, which posits the past as closed off and the future as open, is 
replaced by a notion of time as a project. Instead of thinking time as linear 
progression in which action is endlessly deferred and disaster just a vague possibility 
in our collective consciousness or as a cycle from which we cannot break free, Dupuy 
suggests we envisage time in terms of a loop in which the present aligns itself with 
the aftermath of major catastrophe, the moment when disaster has already occurred. 
Hence, it becomes possible to excavate the ruins of the future and subsequently 
decide on the ‘retrospective’ action needed to circumvent a catastrophic event before 
it has occurred. According to Dupuy, it is only by fully recognizing future widespread 
disaster as foregone conclusion that we have any chance of acting effectively to 
prevent the event from ever actually occurring. 
We can better explain this concept of a ‘loop’ with recourse to the film Looper 
(2012). In 2074, the mob carry out hits by sending people back into the past where 
they come face to face with a waiting ‘looper’ or hitman. Each looper knows there 
may come a time when the hit sent back is, in fact, his future self. Once this final hit 
is carried out, the looper receives a large payoff, retires and the loop is closed. This is 
what is supposed to happen. Yet, with every loop there is the potential for a loophole. 
To create an opening, a loophole, a doubling has to occur whereby history repeats 
itself allowing for the possibility of difference. When Joe, a young looper, comes face 
to face with his future self he hesitates, giving his older self the chance to escape. Yet, 
the event is replayed and this time Joe kills his future self without hesitation and 
retires. 
Where the insurance scene in Twelve Monkeys provides a postscript to 
Marker’s La Jetée without really altering the main narrative, in Looper, the endless 
cycle, which sees a small boy witness the death of his adult self again and again, is 
called to a halt. Both the viewer and Joe have to truly believe the loop has been 
closed, that he has killed his future self and taken his payoff. Otherwise, there will be 
no future self to come back and prevent this from happening. However, the 
subsequent confrontation of present and future selves produces a cleavage, shifting 
the focus from their respective quests for personal happiness to greater questions of 
social responsibility. 
Despite eschewing an openly apocalyptic narrative, Looper embodies the 
conceptual leap of faith defined by Dupuy, resisting the inherent conservatism of 
much apocalyptic discourse. It achieves this by shifting common perceptions of 
ethical responsibility as ultimately responsibility towards ourselves, our family and 
those like us towards a dangerous, subversive unknown. This dangerous other takes 
the form of Cid, a small child whose powers of telekinesis are causing widespread 
terror and destruction in the future, marking him out as a target for Joe. Consequently, 
where La Jetée and Twelve Monkeys evoke childhood innocence as something which 
is always already lost, in Looper such innocence is presented in terms of an 
incomprehensible, uncontrollable threat which nevertheless requires our full 
protection and care. Herein lies the real conceptual leap, not simply believing the 
future as certainty in order to effectively change it, but accepting responsibility for a 
future which cannot correspond to our own way of life and its values. My reading of 
Looper here echoes Christopher Groves’ (2010) attempt to define a ‘future of care’ 
(121) over against the limits of short-term risk management strategies focused on 
calculability (107). We might consider such strategies as embodied in the smartwatch 
and the notion of the ‘quantified self’. As Groves points out, all ethics is about the 
future, a future which while not calculable so to speak, is at the same time far from 
empty in the possibilities it offers up (121). 
If Dupuy’s ‘time as a project’ is an interesting proposal for the management of 
disaster despite the conceptual acrobatics and sleights of hand it requires, it is also 
precisely this artificial, staged, unnatural proximity proposed here that is at stake in 
Virilio’s vehement attack of the loss of distance and horizon framing our experience 
of space and time. If Dupuy identifies the difficulty of thinking the future as foregone 
conclusion, for Virilio this has become all too easy in a world where there is no longer 
duration or distance between subject and object but instead a perpetual present. 
Everything is given up to us immediately and the consequence of this immediacy is, 
for Virilio, the death of history and geography. Here, Virilio shares with Marzec the 
position that a future posited as foregone conclusion, as fulfilled promise, can only 
ever exist in the service of this eternal present. This is a present which in thus 
enslaving the future, also obliterates any sustained concept of the past and, indeed, the 
ethico-moral responsibility we bear towards its victims. 
Moreover the question of climate-led disaster becomes irrelevant unless we 
develop a notion of ecology which incorporates a critique of what Virilio refers to as 
‘time pollution.’ As much attention needs to be given to the effects of ‘machine time’ 
on the environment as is given to the impact of machinery and technology on space 
instead of reducing these to narrowly conceived economic and political concerns: 
‘Unless we treat ecology simply as public management of profits and losses in the 
substances and stocks that make up the human environment, it can no longer 
effectively make headway without also making sense of the temporal economy of 
interactive activities and their rapid mutations.’ (Virilio, 1991b: 23) Marzec takes this 
a step further in identifying a drive to disaster embodied in military strategies engaged 
in proving their necessity:  
 
Even though the worst-case scenario is unlikely, it becomes the target— the smoking gun— 
that confirms the need for the predominance of military modes of thought, experimentation, 
and action. National security experts play on the catastrophic to criticize a more patient 
science for its adherence to the most ‘likely’ scenario and for its failure to give us the truth of 
extreme climate changes (Marzec, 2015: 43). 
 
Responding to criticisms that his ‘enlightened’ catastrophism embodies this form of 
fatalism described by Marzec above, Dupuy has more recently countered this 
perception of his work with an insistence on the optimism of his position (Dupuy, 
2012: 229). It is this ‘optimism’ alongside the ‘patient science’ Marzec alludes to that 
is necessary in the task of rethinking time within a context of care of and for the 
future. Thus, what we should take from Virilio and his warnings about the speed and 
accelerationism defining our experience or non-experience of the world is the 
groundwork for a non-urgent critique of urgency working alongside this notion of 
future as ‘care’. 
 
Conclusion. Reset 
In his witty account of his obsessive use of his Fitbit in The New Yorker, David 
Sedaris (2014) describes the moment of paralysis that comes when his device stops 
working one day. The extensive walking previously undertaken appears pointless 
when it is not tracked and logged. His response once the initial shock subsides is to 
order a new device and, on its (next-day) delivery, catch up for lost time (and steps). 
Consciousness comes into play, Virilio tells us (a point Marzec takes up), at the 
moment of the accident, when technology breaks down (Virilio, 1990: 6, cited in 
Marzec, 2015: 36). Yet, the space for pause provides limited opportunity for 
reflection or the pursuit of alternative practices. Sedaris had to wait less than a day for 
his replacement Fitbit. Following Virilio, Marzec suggests that far from producing a 
useful rupture with technology that might draw our attention to the toxic nature of a 
dependence on devices like the smartwatch or health tracker, all that emerges from 
the accident is a call for more technology (Marzec, 2015: 37). 
Yet, perhaps the potential to resist such devices or reconfigure their uses in 
line with more collective notions of care lies not in the failure, or indeed destruction, 
of their technology but in their efficacy. The banning of health trackers by the military 
and the recent debates about their use in and around military bases suggests ways in 
which such devices might be turned against the military industrial complex. One 
example can be found in the various forms of countermapping produced using the 
heatmap images generated by the Strava fitness tracker, aesthetic practices which in 
the first instance render covert practices of surveillance and securitization more 
visible and thus contestable. 
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Notes 
i Virilio opens with a reference to the speed at which new legislation is pushed through, 
arguing that paradoxically this produces paralysis within the legal system since each 
new piece of legislation is already at risk of obsolescence. (Virilio, 2012:2). 
																																																																																																																																																														
ii In a piece for the New Yorker, David Sedaris sends up his own ‘obsessive’ relationship with 
his Fitbit (Sedaris, 2014). More recently, teachers have spoken out about the use of health 
trackers by children and college students and the potential damage ‘arbitrary goals’ might 
have on mental health and well-being (Turner, 2018). In 2016, Oral Roberts University in 
the United States came under fire for making students wear ‘grade-issuing’ Fitbits (Ali, 
2016).  
iii I have used this example of ‘insurance’ elsewhere in relation to Dupuy’s enlightened 
catastrophism. See XXXX, 2014. 
